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Weekly Edition - November 2025-Week 1
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The tone in Dhaka has also softened. Last week, Bangladeshi foreign affairs adviser Mohammad Touhid Hossain remarked that bilateral relations would not be stalled because of a few unresolved issues, including the Hasina affair.
By Sadik Sagar, Dhaka, December 4, 2025
Amid months of strained relations, India and Bangladesh appear to be cautiously moving toward a diplomatic thaw, with recent gestures from both sides indicating an attempt to stabilize ties in the post–Sheikh Hasina political landscape.
Indo-Pacific Dynamics in Focus as Putin Paying Key Visit to India
By Sadik Saga, Dhaka, December 4, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trip to India (December 4-5) is set to be one of the most closely watched diplomatic developments of the year. His first trip to New Delhi since the Ukraine war began, the visit is expected to reinvigorate the India–Russia strategic partnership at a time of shifting global power balances and heightened volatility across the Indo-Pacific.
Rohingya Crisis Poised to Continue Amid International Skepticism of Myanmar’s Election
By Sadik Sagar, Dhaka, December 4, 2024
With Myanmar’s national election set to begin on December 28, 2025, concerns are mounting among international organisations and regional powers about the credibility of the upcoming polls. These
Taliban Minister’s Visit to India Marks a Groundbreaking Shift in South Asian Diplomacy
Sadik Sagar, October 22, Dhaka.
Afghan Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s week-long visit to India has been described as one of the most significant diplomatic breakthroughs in South Asia since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. The visit, once unimaginable, signals a dramatic recalibration of India’s Afghan policy and a potential reshaping of regional alliances that could reverberate from Kabul to Islamabad and beyond. Muttaqi’s arrival in New Delhi marked the Taliban’s highest-level engagement with India since the fall of Kabul. During his eight-day stay, the Afghan minister held extensive talks with Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, discussed trade and development cooperation, and met with Indian business leaders. The Indian government also announced plans to reopen its full-fledged embassy in Kabul, four years after it was shuttered amid the Taliban takeover. Delhi’s decision underscores a pragmatic shift in its foreign policy—one that prioritizes strategic interests and regional stability over ideology. For decades, India viewed the Taliban as a proxy of Pakistan and supported the Western-backed Afghan government ousted by the Taliban in 2021. The renewed engagement, therefore, represents a remarkable departure from that stance. “Closer cooperation between us contributes to your national development as well as regional stability and resilience,” Jaishankar told Muttaqi, reaffirming India’s “commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Afghanistan.” In turn, Muttaqi described India as a “close friend,” expressing optimism about “a bright future” in bilateral relations.
Although India has yet to formally recognize the Taliban government, it maintains a “technical team” in Kabul and has continued providing humanitarian aid since 2021. Analysts believe India’s engagement with the Taliban reflects a broader realignment of power and pragmatism across the region. “Both sides are demonstrating realpolitik,” observed Harsh V. Pant of the Observer Research Foundation. “India wants to secure its interests and stability in the region, while the Taliban seeks legitimacy and diversification beyond Pakistan.”
Islamabad, which long served as the Taliban’s chief patron, is watching the India-Taliban rapprochement with growing unease. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have deteriorated sharply in recent months, culminating in deadly border clashes and mutual accusations of harboring militants. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif accused India of “inciting” the Taliban, while Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif went further, claiming that Kabul was “acting like a proxy of India.” These statements underscore Islamabad’s anxiety over losing influence on its once-reliable ally. Afghan analyst Wahid Faqiri told media that the Taliban’s engagement with India is “both symbolic and strategic,” sending a clear message that Afghanistan is no longer dependent on Pakistan and can pursue independent diplomacy. The timing of Muttaqi’s visit—coinciding with some of the worst fighting between Afghan and Pakistani forces in years—amplified its geopolitical significance. Recent exchanges of artillery and drone strikes along the border highlighted how the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship has soured. Pakistan accuses the Taliban of sheltering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has waged a deadly insurgency inside Pakistan. Over 100 Pakistani security personnel were reportedly killed in militant attacks in October alone. The Taliban deny these allegations and, in turn, accuse Pakistan of attempting to destabilize Afghanistan. Former Pakistani diplomat Maleeha Lodhi told media that Islamabad’s frustration stemmed mainly from security concerns, though she acknowledged that the Taliban minister’s India trip “was certainly an irritant.”
For India, the engagement with the Taliban is rooted in both strategy and security. New Delhi’s primary objective is to ensure Afghan soil is not used by anti-India terror groups such as al-Qaeda or Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K). During his visit, Muttaqi reiterated that Afghanistan would not allow its territory to be used for terrorism against India. Moreover, India’s outreach aligns with its broader ambitions to enhance connectivity with Iran and Central Asia, creating trade and energy corridors that bypass Pakistan. With China expanding its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, India’s dialogue with the Taliban also serves to counter regional encirclement and maintain its foothold in Afghanistan. However, the diplomatic thaw has sparked debate at home. Critics in India have questioned the optics of hosting a Taliban delegation given the group’s human rights record and restrictions on women. The absence of women journalists during Muttaqi’s press interactions drew condemnation, though public sentiment softened when the Afghan minister expressed solidarity with India following a terrorist attack in Kashmir, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan-backed militants. The joint statement issued after the visit referred to the disputed region as “Jammu and Kashmir, India,” a phrasing that reportedly infuriated Islamabad.
India’s decision to upgrade its mission in Kabul to a full embassy marks another step in the Taliban government’s pursuit of international legitimacy—something only Russia has formally granted so far. While full diplomatic recognition from India appears unlikely in the near term, the thaw represents a significant victory for the Taliban’s foreign policy. For Pakistan, it marks a geopolitical setback; for India, it is an opportunity to regain lost ground in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal. For the Taliban, it is proof that engaging with regional powers beyond Pakistan is not only possible but beneficial. “Just four years ago, this scenario was unimaginable,” strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney told media. “Today, it marks a cautious reset in India-Taliban relations—a balancing act rooted in pragmatic engagement rather than trust.” As Muttaqi’s historic visit concluded, both Delhi and Kabul hailed it as a “new beginning.” Whether this beginning leads to genuine partnership or remains a tactical alignment remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the political geography of South Asia is shifting—and India’s open door to the Taliban has redrawn the region’s diplomatic map in ways few could have foreseen.
India–Bangladesh Border Dispute: Resolution, Political Shifts & Emerging Challenges
Tanvir Rusmat:
The India–Bangladesh border dispute is widely seen as one of South Asia’s rare success stories in resolving complex territorial issues peacefully. Several longstanding disputes over enclaves, land boundaries, and maritime zones have largely been settled. However, with recent political changes in Bangladesh, new tensions and challenges are surfacing that threaten to test the fragile equilibrium achieved.
The landmark Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) of 2015, signed under the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, brought close to 160 enclaves on both sides into formal alignment. Small yet symbolically significant parcels of territory were exchanged, millions of people were affected, and sovereignty ambiguities were largely removed. Analysts regard this as a major diplomatic victory and proof that territorial disputes between India and Bangladesh can be resolved amicably.
In addition, prior international rulings—particularly over maritime boundaries—have given Bangladesh substantial rights over portions of the Bay of Bengal, under the United Nations-administered tribunals. These judgments have been accepted by India, averting what many feared might become recurrent confrontations.
Since August 2024, Bangladesh has undergone significant political change. Widespread protests led to the resignation of Sheikh Hasina, and an interim government led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus took over. This shift has had a ripple effect on Bangladesh’s foreign policy, including its approach to border issues with India.
Under the new leadership, Bangladesh has adopted a more assertive diplomatic stance in talks with India—especially concerning fencing, border infrastructure, and what Dhaka perceives as unfair or imbalanced agreements. For example, in early 2025, Bangladesh criticized India’s initiative to erect a single-row fence along stretches of the border, citing environmental impacts and harm to local livelihoods.
Domestic political rhetoric has changed too. Where previously the focus under Hasina was more on maintaining bilateral harmony and gradual cooperation, the interim government has been more vocal about “uneven agreements” that, in Dhaka’s view, favoured Indian security concerns over Bangladesh’s sovereignty and human rights.
Some of the new flashpoints involve:
Allegations of people being “pushed back” into Bangladesh from Indian border security operations, including refugees and migrants. Bangladesh claims due process is often ignored in such operations.
Accusations that Indian border fencing and infrastructure projects proceed without adequate consultation, infringing upon rights of border communities.
Concerns over border killings, smuggling, and other illicit cross-border activity. Bangladesh has emphasized a desire to renegotiate or reform aspects of border management protocol.
Prof. Rahim Uddin, a political scientist at Dhaka University, says: “The LBA under Hasina settled many technicalities, but the political will must now match legal frameworks. The interim government seems intent on pushing back where it perceives imbalance.”
Another analyst, former diplomat Sara Begum, remarks, “While Delhi has long treated India-Bangladesh relations through strategic cooperation, Dhaka’s shift in tone reflects a more equity-oriented diplomacy, perhaps because the domestic audience under the Yunus government demands accountability for past border policies.”
The changes in tone and policy have real stakes. India may view Bangladesh’s new demands and criticisms as unsettling, particularly in state governments near the border that are sensitive to migration or security issues. Some trade corridors and transit agreements that functioned under the previous regime may face renegotiation or disruption if Bangladesh insists on stricter border controls or amended terms. Bangladesh’s re-engagement with China and Pakistan, broader international diplomacy, and recalibration of its “Look East / South Asia” policy may influence how India responds.
The India–Bangladesh border dispute, once a potential source of prolonged tension, has largely been resolved in legal and diplomatic terms. But political changes in Bangladesh are now testing whether those resolutions will hold under new expectations of sovereignty, equity, and human rights. For now, both sides appear willing to talk yet as Dhaka becomes more assertive, diplomatic friction and renegotiation may become the new norm.
Pakistan–Saudi Defence Pact Sparks Talk of a “Southern NATO” Amid Shifting Asian Power Balance
Tanvir Rusmat: Dhaka, October 11,2025
A landmark Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has sent ripples across South Asia and the Middle East, as analysts speculate it could mark the first step toward a broader regional alliance a so-called “Southern NATO.”
Signed in September 2025, the agreement declares that an attack on one country will be considered an attack on both a clause reminiscent of NATO’s Article 5. While the pact does not explicitly reference nuclear deterrence, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif hinted that “the capabilities we possess could extend to Saudi Arabia if required,” though he later clarified that nuclear cooperation is “not part of the formal framework.”
Saudi officials emphasized that the pact is “not directed against any specific state” but is aimed at “comprehensive defense and mutual stability.” The move, however, has heightened geopolitical anxieties across the region, with India, Iran, and China closely monitoring developments.
Soon after the signing, a Saudi business delegation arrived in Islamabad to explore defense-linked investment and energy cooperation, indicating that the pact might evolve beyond military terms into a multi-dimensional strategic partnership. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif hailed it as “a historic milestone in multidimensional economic, strategic, and defense cooperation between two brotherly nations.”
Regional experts suggest the agreement could reshape existing security architectures in Asia, particularly as the Quad Alliance (US, Japan, India, Australia) seeks to counterbalance China’s expanding influence. According to Dr. Hamid Al-Rashid, a Gulf security analyst, “This deal signals a new chapter in Muslim world security cooperation. Whether it becomes NATO-like depends largely on U.S. engagement and China’s reaction.”
Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar echoed similar sentiments in parliament, noting that “if more nations join this framework, it could evolve into a NATO-style alliance in the Global South.”
Still, the prospect of a full-fledged “Southern NATO” remains uncertain. Experts point to deep political divisions, competing national interests, and the absence of any binding collective defense mechanism. Yet, as Brookings Institution analysts observed, the SMDA “sets a precedent for extended deterrence and power realignment in the Islamic world.”
Though in its infancy, the Pakistan–Saudi pact could redefine regional security narratives and possibly ignite the South’s own version of a new Cold War.
Anti-India, pro-Islamic forces conspired to oust Sheikh Hasina
Anti-India, pro-Islamic forces conspired to oust Sheikh Hasina
1 October, 2025. This article based on B. Z. Khasru's new book, 'Hasina, Yunus and the United States: The Power Struggle for Bangladesh'
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh, who fled to neighbouring country India on 5 August 2024 after massive violent street protests, fought a political guerrilla war for years against her successor Muhamad Yunus, a 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner. She defeated him in 2011 when a court kicked him out of Grameen Bank, a world-famous institution he built from the ground up.
The legal battle was part of Hasina’s game plan to cut down the U.S. protégé to prevent him from becoming too strong to replace her with himself. In the end, however, she lost out to the U.S.-trained development economist.
Three days after Hasina’s ouster, Yunus became de facto prime minister, albeit unelected, fulfilling the wishes of anti-Hasina agitators. On the surface, it appeared that the students led the successful street protests, but in reality, deep-rooted religious-political cliques in the Muslim-majority South Asian nation of 170 million Bengalis fomented the unrest from behind the scenes.
This is evident from the fact that the agitation, which started with a simple demand to repeal a special job allocation policy that allegedly favoured ruling party followers, suddenly transformed into a mass ultimatum for the prime minister’s resignation. The dynamics of the protest shifted even though Hasina had accepted the protesters’ demands earlier.
The demand for the quota reform, which culminated in the ouster of Hasina, was merely a facade used by anti-Hasina, pro-Islamic, anti-Hindu, and anti-India factions to incite public sentiment aimed at toppling the prime minister.
QUOTA REFORM ISSUE FAKE
QUOTA REFORM ISSUE FAKE
The civil service comprises only 1.6 million jobs within a workforce of 73 million, and more than 400,000 candidates vie each year for fewer than 4,000 available positions, representing just one per cent. Thus, these jobs logically cannot be a significant issue for the vast multitude of job seekers, even though the allure of prestige and employment security may exist. The real issue was the belief that the Hindus held far more of these positions than their share of the population justified.
For many years, rumours have run rampant in Bangladesh that Hasina had imported many Hindus from India to fill top civil service jobs to ensure loyal Awami League supporters were in the administration. The omnipresence of Indian businesspeople in Dhaka greatly fueled this view. Ordinary people asserted that they often saw these “imported Hindus” in the media serving as government spokespersons yet speaking in a dialect different from theirs.
Hindus, who make up 8 per cent of Bangladesh’s population, held 12 per cent of civil service cadre officer positions in 2017. They occupied only 3 per cent of these jobs in 2001 when Hasina ended her first term as prime minister. The data clearly show that the number of Hindu civil servants started to rise since Hasina returned to power in 2009.
This occurred due to job quotas for the freedom fighters. No hard figures are available, but the proportion of Hindus among the freedom fighters is likely greater than their demographic ratio. This is so because 80 per cent of the refugees who went to India in 1971 were Hindus, many of whom fought in the Bangladesh Liberation War and later received preference in civil service jobs under the quota system.
Anti-Hasina elements used this phenomenon to falsely accuse the prime minister of giving jobs to her supporters (read Hindus), an accusation that incited the unsuspecting common people against her.
In Bangladesh, Hindus are often equated with India, even though they are natural-born citizens. In addition, Hasina was widely regarded as India’s lackey and a darling of Hindus, who allegedly often sacrificed national interests to appease Delhi. The Hasina administration failed to effectively counter this simmering public perception.
ARMY DEFIED HASINA'S ORDER
ARMY DEFIED HASINA'S ORDER
All indications suggest that the military sealed Sheikh Hasina’s fate on Sunday night (4 August) when it refused to comply with her order to impose stricter security measures to suppress the violent agitation. The anti-Hasina stance of the mid-level officers, who declined to order the soldiers under their command to shoot the agitators, was leaked out to the demonstrators.
This information emboldened throngs of people to take to the streets the following day. This was an undeclared coup d’etat, a betrayal from Hasina’s point of view. The outcome proves once again that the military is the power behind the throne in this violence-plagued, hapless Bengali nation.
There was a widely circulated rumour in Bangladesh that Army General Waker-Uz-Zaman held a virtual meeting with his field commanders the night before Hasina’s removal. During the meeting, the commanders informed the general they would not order the soldiers under their command to shoot the protesters to end the street demonstrations.
There were also reports that two days earlier junior officers had already expressed concerns about being asked to fire on civilians in a meeting with the Army chief. The chief became virtually powerless, but it remains a mystery if he kept this information secret from the prime minister, denying her precious time to formulate her new moves.
The next morning, around 11 o’clock on 5 August, when Hasina asked military and police chiefs why they could not control the mobs, they told her the demonstrations were too massive for the security forces to suppress. They also advised her that the violent protesters could reach the prime minister’s palace in 45 minutes and that she must leave immediately to save her life. Hasina refused.
The Army chief, who is married to a cousin of Hasina, then appealed to Hasina’s younger sister, Sheikh Rehana, and Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, who lives in the United States, to persuade the prime minister to give up. With so little time to think it through, Hasina relented and decided to leave her homeland under prodding from her family.
HASINA MADE FATAL MISTAKE
HASINA MADE FATAL MISTAKE
This was a fatal mistake. She could have turned the tables by fortifying herself in her home district and urging her supporters to come out in large numbers to demonstrate her popular appeal. The sheer presence of massive pro-Hasina crowds in the streets would have uplifted her followers, pushed back her opponents, maintained military loyalty, and turned the tide in her favour.
The Awami League is much stronger today than it was in 1975 when a confused party faced a brutal military coup that resulted in the death of Hasina’s father and Bangladesh’s founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, while other top leaders became bewildered.
A nationwide survey by the International Republican Institute, a nonpartisan democracy promoter in Washington, D.C., in August 2023 found that despite having serious concerns about the economic outlook, elections and corruption, seventy per cent of Bangladeshis approved of Hasina’s performance. The government’s policies on infrastructure and development buoyed the prime minister’s public support.
Hasina first became prime minister after her party, the Awami League, won parliamentary elections in 1996 but later lost to Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in 2001. She returned to power in 2009 through elections and remained in office until her downfall, securing three more contentious victories in subsequent polls, which critics alleged were rigged in her favour.
It remained unclear whether Hasina had actually quit. The Army chief told the nation in a broadcast that she had resigned, but the former prime minister later claimed from exile in India that she never officially tendered her resignation and that she remained the legal head of the government.
No one could produce Hasina’s resignation letter, and the president, Mohammed Shahabuddin, who was supposed to receive the letter as per the constitution, stated that he had no documentary evidence that the prime minister had truly stepped down. This raised questions about the legal validity of the current administration.
YUNUS FOLLOWED MUSSOLINI
YUNUS FOLLOWED MUSSOLINI
Yunus took over Bangladesh in precisely the same manner that dictator Benito Mussolini captured power in Italy. In the night between 27 and 28 October 1922, about 30,000 Fascists converged on Rome to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Luigi Facta and the appointment of Mussolini as prime minister. On 28 October, King Victor Emmanuel, who held the supreme military power, refused the government’s request to impose martial law, leading to Facta’s resignation and Mussolini’s power grab.
On 4 August 2024, sporadic clashes between the protesters and the security forces broke out in Bangladesh, killing an estimated 300 people. On 5 August 2024, after word spread that the soldiers would not shoot the demonstrators, throngs of anti-Hasina agitators took to the streets, many of them marching toward the capital Dhaka defying a nationwide curfew. This forced the military to urge Hasina to resign.
After Hasina’s resignation as prime minister and departure to India, the protesters named Yunus as Bangladesh’s ruler. On 8 August, the president swore Yunus in as de facto prime minister. Bangladesh’s constitution provides for no interim government, and it is considered high treason to capture power by force. There is widespread speculation that the next elected government will declare the Yunus government illegal and its actions null and void.
With Hasina’s chaotic overthrow, Bangladesh has regained its notoriety as a nation of chronic violence and anarchy where angry street mobs—rather than voters—choose rulers. This situation has seriously hurt the country’s economy, especially the readymade garments sector, which accounted for 84 per cent of the nation’s total exports in 2023 and employed millions of people, mostly women. The International Monetary Fund predicted that Bangladesh’s growth could drop by two percentage points in 2025, falling from nearly 6 per cent in 2023.
Hasina, no doubt, used a steamroller to suppress dissent during her fifteen-year continuous rule. But she also dazzled the world by turning the basket-case Bangladesh into an economic wonder and an island of stability, notwithstanding the propaganda unleashed by the successor regime to tarnish her image by throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Bangladesh’s stable macroeconomic conditions helped achieve an annual real growth of 6.4 per cent on average between 2010 and 2023, the World Bank reported.
During her rule, according to the International Monetary Fund, extreme poverty halved to less than 6 per cent and per capita income soared nearly fivefold exceeding $2,600, the best record in Bengal’s history. Indeed, if the same growth trend continued for the next fifteen years, Bangladesh could emerge as a highly respected middle-income country, becoming the Switzerland of the East as envisioned by its founder.
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