By Tanvir Rusmat, Dhaka, Jan 13, 2026

Bangladesh is navigating a delicate path in defence diplomacy, balancing deepening cooperation with the United States while maintaining long-standing military ties with China. As strategic competition between Washington and Beijing intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, Dhaka’s effort to preserve autonomy is becoming increasingly complex and consequential.

In recent years, military engagement between Bangladesh and the United States has grown more visible and structured. The two countries’ armed forces have expanded joint exercises, including “Exercise Tiger Lightning and Pacific Angel”, aimed not only at combat readiness but also at humanitarian assistance, disaster response and logistical coordination. Bangladeshi officials say these engagements have helped raise professional standards within the armed forces and align them with international best practices.

The growing cooperation has been underscored by remarks from Brent Christensen, the US ambassador-designate to Bangladesh, during his congressional testimony. Christensen indicated that, if confirmed, he would seek closer engagement with Dhaka, including frank discussions about the strategic risks posed by China’s expanding military footprint in the region. He also highlighted the benefits of closer defence ties with Washington, particularly through joint training and exercises that enhance interoperability. Strengthening the Bangladeshi military, he argued, would contribute to a “free, secure and stable Indo-Pacific”.

Yet Bangladesh’s defence relationship with China remains a central pillar of its military posture. A significant portion of the country’s naval and air force hardware has been sourced from Beijing, and cooperation on defence procurement continues. For Dhaka, these ties are rooted in affordability, familiarity and long-term logistical dependence, making a sudden shift both costly and impractical.

Taken together, Bangladesh’s defence diplomacy reflects the broader dilemma facing many mid-sized states in the Indo-Pacific

The government has sought to frame this dual engagement as a conscious strategy rather than a contradiction. Md Touhid Hossain, Bangladesh’s foreign policy adviser, has said the country is committed to maintaining balanced relations with all major powers. He has emphasised that cooperation with China in defence matters is a sovereign decision and expressed confidence that such engagement would not push Bangladesh into a position that could trigger punitive international sanctions.

Analysts see both opportunity and risk in this approach. Closer defence cooperation with the United States offers access to advanced training, operational exposure and international credibility, particularly as Bangladesh continues to play a prominent role in UN peacekeeping missions. At the same time, sustained reliance on Chinese military equipment limits Dhaka’s room for manoeuvre, especially as great-power rivalry sharpens and pressure mounts on smaller states to align more clearly.

For Bangladesh, the challenge lies in managing perception as much as policy. Any move interpreted as tilting too far towards one camp risks diplomatic or economic repercussions from the other. Conversely, an overly cautious stance could reduce the strategic value that major powers see in engaging with Dhaka.

Taken together, Bangladesh’s defence diplomacy reflects the broader dilemma facing many mid-sized states in the Indo-Pacific. By seeking security partnerships without formal alignment, Dhaka is attempting to safeguard its interests amid intensifying rivalry. The margin for error, however, is narrowing, and maintaining balance will require increasingly careful judgement in the years ahead.