As Pakistan Pitches New Alliance, Bangladesh Faces Fresh Geopolitical Calculus

By Sadik Sagar, Dhaka, December 11, 2025

Bangladesh has emerged as one of the most strategically affected countries in South Asia following Pakistan’s push for a new regional bloc that would exclude India. For Dhaka — which is navigating strained ties with New Delhi, cautiously improving relations with Islamabad, and deepening engagement with China — the proposal presents both an opportunity and a diplomatic minefield.

The initiative comes at a time when Bangladesh–India relations have sharply deteriorated, particularly after the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina last year. Hasina fled to India after being deposed in a popular uprising and was later convicted of crimes against humanity by a Dhaka tribunal. New Delhi has refused to return her, further straining bilateral ties. Against this backdrop, Islamabad’s alternative regional vision adds a new layer of complexity to Dhaka’s strategic calculations.

“This proposal, ambitious though, is critically needed,” Professor Shahab Enam Khan, Executive Director of the Bangladesh Center for Indo-Pacific Affairs, speaking to Al Jazeera. “South Asia has repeatedly failed at pragmatic regionalism or even so-called minilateralism, trapped in security-dominated thinking, or perhaps political myopia.”

Analysts say Bangladesh’s shifting diplomatic alignments are partly reshaping the regional landscape itself. “The quiet demise of SAARC, due to frozen relations between India and Pakistan, created a vacuum for another South Asian forum,” Praveen Donthi, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera. “Bangladesh’s deteriorating ties with India and improving relations with Pakistan paved the way for trilateral cooperation with China.”

Dhaka’s dilemma lies in the balance. India remains essential for Bangladesh in terms of trade, connectivity, transit, and energy security. At the same time, China has expanded its political and economic footprint through major infrastructure and defense engagements. Pakistan’s proposed bloc would likely be backed — or at least quietly supported — by Beijing, making Bangladesh’s response even more sensitive.

Still, many smaller South Asian states, including Bangladesh, are increasingly frustrated with regional stagnation. Professor Khan argues that a mindset shift is needed: “Countries must move beyond traditional geopolitical rivalries. Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives are increasingly recognising they need deeper regional cooperation that serves their economic interests, not just the concerns of larger powers.”

But India’s sensitivities will remain a major constraint. Participation in any grouping perceived as anti-India risks political, economic, and security repercussions for Dhaka. Donthi warns the initiative “could further widen the gap between India and Bangladesh and also add to India’s regional competition with China.”

In June, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh held trilateral talks centred on development and stability, insisting the cooperation was “not directed at any third party.” But with India–Pakistan tensions escalating sharply — including a brief four-day air war in May — regional geopolitics remain highly volatile.

The question now is whether other South Asian states — Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan, Afghanistan, alongside Bangladesh — are willing to join a new initiative that appears designed to curb India’s influence.

For Bangladesh, the challenge is immediate and delicate: how to explore emerging regional platforms without jeopardizing essential ties with New Delhi, while still securing strategic space in an increasingly fragmented South Asia.